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ABSTRACT  
   
Russellian monism is a promising theory of consciousness that attempts to capture 
the strengths of both physicalism and dualism while avoiding their weaknesses. I begin 
by showing that the Russellian monist’s chief anti-physicalist rival, emergentism, is 
unable to give an adequate solution to the exclusion problem. Specifically, they fall prey 
to what I call “the opacity problem.” That is, because the emergentist is committed to 
there being both a sufficient physical cause and a sufficient mental cause for our actions, 
it is unclear what difference the mental cause is making in bringing about the effect. This 
is because, for the physical cause to truly be a sufficient cause, it must be sufficient to 
bring about the effect as it occurred. This distinguishes mental overdetermination from 
non-problematic kinds of overdetermination (like double rock throwing cases). I then 
show how the constitutive Russellian monist is able to avoid the exclusion problem, 
while the emergent Russellian monist faces similar opacity problems to emergentism. 
Finally, I give an account of how the constitutive Russellian monist can give a response 
to the strongest objection against—the subject-summing problem. I argue that we only 
have translucent access to our conscious states—that is, only part of the essential nature 
of the state is revealed to us through introspection. I then argue that we have reason to 
think that part of the essential nature of the conscious state not revealed to us is involved 
in subject-summing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CLEARING THE FIELD: AGAINST EMERGENCE1 
In nature everything happens by degrees, nothing by jumps. 
– G.W. Leibniz (New Essays, IV, 16) 
The current debate in the philosophy of mind (specifically in theories of 
consciousness) is lively and the field of contenders vast. Old standards like physicalism 
and substance dualism still maintain adherents, but many are not content with the 
solutions offered to the standard objections to these views. Varieties of idealism are 
seeing a comeback with recent work by David Chalmers and others.2 However, in my 
opinion the two most exciting and promising ways forward on the problem of 
consciousness are theories of emergence and panpsychism—specifically, Russellian 
monism, which attempts to capture the strengths of both dualism and physicalism while 
avoiding their weaknesses.3 
While I find the work being done in emergence interesting, I don’t think it is the 
best path forward as a theory of consciousness. In this chapter, I will argue that we should 
reject the emergentist’s position because she cannot adequately deal with mental 
causation. I will frame this discussion in terms of Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion problem.4 
                                                 
1 An earlier, and very different, version of this chapter was presented at the 2016 Northwest Philosophy 
Conference at Gonzaga University. I’m grateful for the feedback I received there. I’m also grateful for the 
comments and feedback from Aubrey Spivey, Bernard W. Kobes, Jeff Watson, and the members of the 
Graduate Philosophical Society at Arizona State University. 
 
2 See, for example, David J. Chalmers, “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Panpsychism, ed. William Seager (Routledge, forthcoming). 
 
3 More will be said on Russellian monism in the next chapter. 
 
4 Jaegwon Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues,” in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 66-84. 
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Traditionally, emergence theorists have accepted either a) mental causes overdetermine 
their effects or b) deny that the physical is causally closed, but others are reluctant to 
accept such rampant overdetermination in nature or deny causal closure.5 However, 
because the Russellian monist builds consciousness in at the ground level, as it were, 
mental causation is not as much of a problem. 
However, a) and b) need not be the only answers to the exclusion problem for the 
emergentist. I suggest that the best solution available to emergence theorists is to accept 
Karen Bennett’s compatibilist solution to the exclusion problem, despite Bennett’s claim 
that the solution is only available to physicalists (I show that this is not so).6 If the 
emergentist accepts Bennett’s compatibilist response, it seems as if she is not committed 
to a problematic kind of overdetermination. However, while I think the compatibilist 
response is a better option for the emergentist because it does not require them to accept 
unattractive positions such as a) or b), I argue that it renders the causal contribution of the 
mental opaque and, therefore, mysterious. 
1: Exclusion and Overdetermination 
1.1: The Exclusion Problem 
While Kim’s formulation and terminology are probably the most familiar, I state 
the problem using Karen Bennett’s formulation, due to the centrality of Bennett’s 
proposed solution in the rest of the paper. The exclusion problem concerning mental 
causation comes from the inconsistency of five apparently intuitive principles about the 
                                                 
5 Wilson (2015) gives a typology of two kinds of emergence: weak and strong. Weak emergentists accept 
over determination, while strong emergentists deny causal closure. 
 
6 Karen Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” in Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and 
Causation, ed. Jakob Hohwy, & Jesper Kallestrup (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 280-307. 
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mental. Distinctness: that mental properties are distinct in kind from physical properties. 
Completeness: that all caused physical occurrences have a sufficient physical cause—a 
way of formulating the principle of causal closure. Efficacy: that mental events can cause 
physical ones, i.e., our mental states are not simply epiphenomena. 
Nonoverdetermination: the effects of mental causes are not overdetermined. Exclusion: if 
an effect has more than one sufficient cause, it is overdetermined.7 
This is best illuminated with an example. Say you decide to pick up your drink 
because you are thirsty. Your qualitative feeling of thirst is a mental property so, by 
distinctness, it is not a physical property. But, your picking up your drink is a caused 
physical occurrence, so, by completeness, it has a sufficient physical cause. But, your 
feeling of thirst and your decision to pick up the drink on the table must have played 
some role because, by efficacy, your mental state is not simply an epiphenomenon. 
Further, it seems that your feeling of thirst and decision to pick up the drink is a sufficient 
cause of your actually picking up the drink. If someone were to ask, “why did she pick up 
the drink on the table?” and were answered with “because she was thirsty and decided 
to,” the inquiring person would not need more information to feel as if they had been 
given a satisfactory answer.8 So, it seems as if your picking up the drink has two 
sufficient causes—one physical and one mental. But, by exclusion, we know that if there 
are two sufficient causes, then the effect is overdetermined. But, nonoverdetermination 
tells us that the effects of mental causes are not overdetermined! So, we have a 
                                                 
7 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 281. 
 
8 For more on the connection between causes and explanations, see Fred Dretske, “Reasons and Causes,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 1-15. 
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contradiction. One of these principles—distinctness, completeness, efficacy, 
nonoverdetermination, or exclusion—must go, as they cannot all be true. 
1.2: The Trouble with Overdetermination 
It might not be immediately clear why mental overdetermination is problematic. 
After all, there does seem to be cases of overdetermination in the world. Consider the 
classic case of Billy and Suzy, who both throw rocks at the same window at the same 
time. Their rocks hit the window at the same time and the window shatters. This is clearly 
a case of overdetermination, as Billy throwing the rock is sufficient for the window to 
break and Suzy throwing the rock is sufficient for the window to break. Although a 
thought experiment, there doesn’t seem to be a reason why this couldn’t happen. 
Ted Sider argues that the only argument with any force that overdetermination is 
problematic is the epistemic argument, according to which we lack a reason to accept an 
overdetermining cause because it is not parsimonious.9 I think Sider is incorrect. While I 
agree that the epistemic argument plays a role in why overdetermination is problematic, it 
is not the only reason. Mental overdetermination is problematic for three reasons: 
parsimony, ubiquity, and opacity. However, I think the most pressing reason is opacity. 
One consideration which makes the problem more apparent is parsimony—do not 
multiply entities beyond necessity. In this case, the relevant entities are causes. If there is 
a sufficient physical cause of some event, then one could, in principle, give a complete 
explanation of that event in terms of the sufficient physical cause. In the case of your 
deciding to pick up your drink, the physical explanation would include facts about 
                                                 
9 Theodore Sider, “What’s So Bad About Overdetermination?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 67, no. 3 (2003): 723-725. 
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neurons firing and electric signals traveling causing contractions of your muscles and so 
on. Once this explanation is given, it’s not clear why an explanation in terms of the 
mental cause is necessary—the physical cause gives us a complete explanation. Further, 
it’s not clear what work is left over for the mental cause to do—the physical cause is 
sufficient. As such, because the physical cause is sufficient, one might think that a 
corresponding mental cause simply over-inflates our ontology. 
However, parsimony alone doesn’t seem to be sufficient for explaining why 
mental overdetermination is problematic. Parsimony, after all, requires us not to multiply 
entities beyond necessity. If we are realists about our mental states and their being 
efficacious alongside physical causes, then accepting that there are both sufficient 
physical and mental causes is not inflationary.  
Another consideration that motivates why the overdetermination of mental causes 
is problematic is ubiquity. Specifically, that in every instance where we act there are two 
sufficient causes for that act. To illustrate this, imagine a world where every time 
someone went to ring a doorbell, it rang itself.10 Both the finger ringing the doorbell and 
the doorbell ringing itself are sufficient for the doorbell to ring. Were we in this world, 
we would find the ubiquity of the dual sufficient causes odd. In a similar way, that there 
are dual sufficient causes every time we act should strike us as odd. 
However, it can’t be merely the ubiquity of there being mental overdetermination. 
Firstly, there is an important difference between mental causation the doorbell example, 
the connection between the mental causes and physical causes of our acts isn’t as 
mysterious as the doorbell ringing itself every time it is being rung. Intuitively, there is at 
                                                 
10 This is a twist on a thought experiment in Sider (2003). 
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least a prima facie difference, in that we take it there is some connection between our 
minds and our brains (supposing that we are not Cartesian dualists). 
A third consideration which motivates the problem of mental overdetermination is 
opacity—it’s unclear what contribution the mental cause is making. Consider again the 
case of your deciding to pick up your drink. If the physical cause is sufficient to bring 
about your picking up your drink in exactly the way that you do, then what difference is 
the mental cause making? This case is slightly different than parsimony. For parsimony, 
it was argued that if the physical cause is sufficient, then we shouldn’t accept there is a 
mental cause. For opacity, it is assumed that there is both a sufficient physical and mental 
cause, then it is asked “what difference did the mental cause make?” 
Compare this to what Sara Bernstein identifies as the “two major questions about 
overdetermination.”11 1) Where does the extra (mental) causation come from? 2) Where 
does it go or how does it contribute to the outcome? (Call this this opacity question.) 
Bernstein calls views which give satisfactory answers to both questions causally 
satisfying. That is, it gives a precise account of the causal powers of the mental and 
physical causes and what contribution each cause makes to the effect.12 Here I am not 
concerned with the first question.13 Rather I think the heart of the exclusion problem is 
                                                 
11 Sara Bernstein, “Overdetermination Underdetermined,” Erkenntnis 81 (2016): 30. 
 
12 Bernstein, “Overdetermination Underdetermined,” 3. 
 
13 I do not intend to critique emergentism on the grounds on the nature of the powers of emergent 
substances or of downward causation generally for two reasons: the pragmatic concern of space and, more 
pressingly, I believe this concern is tangential to the concerns of overdetermination. If downward causation 
is in-principle possible, then the nature of the contribution of that cause to its affect (the opacity question) 
still needs to be answered. If downward causation isn’t possible, then there is no problem of 
overdetermination for the emergentist as they must simply endorse epiphenomenalism. 
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the second question, which expresses the opacity worry. A view satisfies the opacity 
problem if it gives a satisfactory answer to the opacity question. 
Why should we think that opacity is the heart of exclusion problem? Because if it 
is unclear what difference the mental cause makes to the effect, then we are left with little 
reason to accept efficacy. 
One might attempt to avoid worries of opacity by appealing to modal fragility. An 
event is modally fragile if it could not have occurred differently. Consider Billy and Suzy 
throwing rocks at the window and assume that the window shatters differently when both 
their rocks hit it than it would if only one rock had hit it. If the window shattering is 
modally fragile, then were Suzy to throw and Billy to not throw, then the window 
shattering would have been a numerically different event from the case where they both 
throw. In contrast, an event is modally robust if it could have had different features and 
still have been the same event. If the window shattering is modally robust, then it’s 
numerically the same event in either case.14 When applied to mental causation, it could be 
argued that your picking up your drink is modally fragile. While the physical cause is 
sufficient for your picking up the drink in some way, the mental cause is partially the 
reason you picked up your drink in the way you did. Had there been only the physical and 
not the mental cause, you would have still picked up your drink, but it would have been a 
different event. 
While this might appear to be an attractive response to some, I am unconvinced. 
Responding in this manner requires denying that the physical cause is sufficient. Assume 
modal fragility. Call the event that occurs when you pick up your drink and there is both 
                                                 
14 Bernstein, “Overdetermination Underdetermined,” 23. 
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the physical and the mental cause c1. Call the event that occurs when you pick up your 
drink and there is only the physical cause c2. By the description of the case, c1 and c2 are 
different events. On this view, the physical cause is only sufficient to bring about c2, not 
c1. In fact, on this view, c1 is not a case of overdetermination at all because there are not 
two sufficient causes. It is a case of joint causation, where there are at least two necessary 
causes that are jointly sufficient.15 If the physical cause of your picking up your drink is 
not a sufficient cause, then we must deny completeness, which requires us to reject causal 
closure of the physical. Without good reason to reject closure, we should be unwilling to 
accept this solution to the problem. As such, the opacity of the mental cause’s 
contribution remains a consideration. 
The aim of this section was to motivate why overdetermination is a problem for 
mental causation. I attempted to motivate the problem in several ways, but the primary 
motivation is the opacity of the mental cause’s contribution. 
2: Bennett’s Solution 
2.1: Physicalism and Compatibilism  
Bennett attempts to give a solution to the exclusion problem that is only available 
to physicalists. For Bennett, physicalism is the acceptance three views: 1) completeness, 
2) all facts are physical facts, and 3) “everything globally supervenes on the physical as a 
matter of metaphysical necessity.”16 Completeness states that all caused physical 
occurrences have a sufficient physical cause. All facts being physical facts rules out any 
nonphysical entities or properties. Everything globally supervenes on the physical with 
                                                 
15 Bernstein, “Overdetermination Underdetermined,” 18. 
 
16 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 284. 
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metaphysical necessity if given any two possible worlds, wx and wy, if wx is physically 
identical to wy, then wx is mentally identical to wy as well. Because, according to Bennett, 
only the physicalist is able to accept metaphysically necessary supervenience of the 
mental over the physical, this final claim is sufficient for the truth of physicalism.17 
Bennett’s solution to the exclusion problem, compatibilism, denies exclusion— if 
an effect has more than one sufficient cause, it is overdetermined. As such, the 
compatibilist maintains that an effect can have more than one sufficient cause and avoid 
overdetermination if there is a sufficiently tight relation between the mental and physical 
causes.18 In order for the mental and physical causes to be sufficiently tight, a position 
must be able to deny the nonvacuous truth of at least one of the following 
counterfactuals: 
(O1) if m had happened without p, e would still have happened: (m & ~p) ☐→ e 
(O2) if p had happened without m, e would still have happened: (p & ~m) ☐→ e 
Where m is the mental cause, p is the physical cause, and e is the effect.19 In terms of the 
example from earlier: m is your decision to pick up the drink along with your feeling of 
thirst, p is all the relevant physical causes (neurons firing, muscles contracting, and so 
forth), and e is your picking up the drink. 
 Bennett argues that the physicalist can deny the nonvacuous truth of (O2), 
because there are no cases where p occurs without m, because the mental supervenes on 
                                                 
17 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. 
 
18 Notice that Bennett’s compatibilism is distinct from the compatibilist position in the free will debate, 
which holds that one can act freely even if one’s act is causally determined.  
 
19 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 288-89. 
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the physical with metaphysical necessity.20 Further, according to Bennett, because only 
the physicalist can accept metaphysically necessary supervenience, they are the only ones 
in a position to have a sufficiently tight relation between the mental and the physical to 
deny the nonvacuous truth of (O1) or (O2). 
2.2: Why Anti-physicalists can’t accept Metaphysically Necessary Supervenience 
Bennett gives four reasons why metaphysically necessary supervenience is 
sufficient for physicalism and, as such, why anti-physicalist positions can’t accept it. 
First, Bennett draws from Jessica Wilson, who argues that physicalists should be 
necessitarians about laws of nature and that necessitarianism collapses the distinction 
between metaphysical and nomological necessity.21 According to Wilson, necessitarians 
hold that “any possible world where there exists a scientific property of a type that 
actually exists is a world where hold all the laws actually governing that property.”22 For 
example, if necessitarianism is true, then in every world where there is gravity, the laws 
that govern gravitational relations in this world will hold in those worlds as well. Bennett 
argues that Wilson’s shows that “genuine dualists have to think that all connections 
between physical properties and mental ones have to be completely—even 
nomologically—contingent.”23 If dualists are required to hold that all relations between 
the mental and the physical are contingent, then they cannot accept metaphysically 
                                                 
20 From here on, any reference to “metaphysically necessary supervenience” should be taken to be in 
reference to “metaphysically necessary supervenience of the mental over the physical.” 
 
21 Jessica Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism,” Nous 39, no. 3 (2005): 437. Here, 
metaphysical necessity is what is necessitated by the natures of things and nomological necessity is what is 
necessitated by the laws of a specific possible world. 
 
22 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism,” 438. 
 
23 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. (emphasis in original) 
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necessary supervenience because there could be some worlds where that contingent 
relation fails to hold. 
 Second, one might worry a supervenience relation is too weak to be sufficient for 
physicalism, because supervenience does not entail dependence and can be symmetrical. 
Bennett argues this can be avoided by specifying that she is discussing asymmetrical 
supervenience and amends her formulation to read, “it is metaphysically necessary that 
everything strongly globally supervenes upon the physical, and not vice versa.”24 That is, 
any two worlds that are physically alike are mentally alike as well, but it need not be the 
case that any two worlds that are mentally alike be physically alike.25 
 Third, Bennett finds “it quite hard to make sense of a version of dualism 
according to which the mental is both genuinely distinct from and metaphysically 
necessitated by the physical.”26 There are two ways to read this challenge. 1) An 
expression of Hume’s Dictum— “there are no metaphysically necessary connections 
between distinct, intrinsically typed entities.”27 If Hume’s Dictum is true, then anti-
physicalists could not accept metaphysically necessary supervenience because the 
connection between the physical and the mental (two distinct, intrinsically typed entities) 
would be contingent. 
                                                 
24 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. (emphasis in original) 
 
25 In the next chapter, I will challenge the relevance of this criterion and whether asymmetric supervenience 
is required to show dependence. However, as we will see, the strong emergentist can easily meet this 
requirement, so it is harmless to let it be here. 
 
26 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 298-99. 
 
27 Jessica Wilson, “What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 80, no. 3 (2010): 595. 
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 Bennett’s fourth challenge is to ask anti-physicalists why zombies seem possible. 
Zombies are physically identical to us, but without any phenomenal properties.28 
According to Bennett, anti-physicalists have two possible responses: (i) zombies are not 
possible upon reflection, (ii) that zombies seem possible speaks more to the structure of 
our concepts than the structure of reality. These options, Bennett notes, are the same 
options physicalists have.29 Implied here is if anti-physicalists give the same answer as 
physicalists, then they are not actually anti-physicalists. 
3: Anti-Physicalism with Metaphysically Necessary Supervenience 
In this section, I aim to show that Bennett is mistaken. I explicate strong 
emergence, a catch-all term for a family of anti-physicalist positions and show that all 
strong emergence positions can meet all four of Bennett’s challenges and, as such, can 
accept metaphysically necessary supervenience. 
3.2: Strong Emergence 
The variety of emergentist positions is vast and many have tried to find a typology 
which neatly sorts them.30 Wilson isn’t unique in using the terms “strong emergence” and 
“weak emergence” do to this work. But, she is unique in using it to describe a 
metaphysical distinction, rather than an epistemological one. For our purposes, we need 
only focus on the positions Wilson characterizes as strong emergence.31 
                                                 
28 David J. Chalmers, “The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism,” in The Character of 
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 142. 
 
29 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” p. 299. 
 
30 Two recent examples can be found in Chalmers (2006) and Clayton (2006). 
 
31 The positions Wilson characterizes as “weak emergence” are compatible with non-reductive physicalist 
accounts like Bennett’s. As such, they need not be discussed among the anti-physicalist contenders because 
if they are non-reductive physicalists, then they can accept compatibilism. However, it might seem odd to 
  13 
Strong emergentists hold that “some special science features are real, distinct, and 
distinctively efficacious” from the physically acceptable entities they synchronically 
depend upon. “Special science features” refer to the entities described by the special 
sciences, such as psychology (minds) and economics (economies). For our purposes, we 
can restrict our talk to talk of minds. So, strong emergentists hold that minds are real, 
distinct, and distinctively efficacious from the brain states they depend upon. Minds, 
according to the strong emergentist, are distinctively efficacious in virtue of their having 
at least one causal power that is not identical with any of the causal powers of the brain.32 
“Powers” here is a shorthand for the causal contributions something makes in bringing 
about an effect and is meant to be metaphysically neutral otherwise.33  
More formally, higher-level feature S strongly emerges from lower-level feature P 
if and only if S synchronically depends on P and S has at least one power that P does 
not.34 For example, conscious states strongly emerge from physical states if conscious 
states synchronically depend on physical states and have at least one power (for example, 
non-epiphenomenal qualitative natures) that the physical states do not have. 
Wilson is not explicit about whether or not strong emergence entails 
metaphysically necessary supervenience. However, drawing from Wilson’s other work, 
                                                 
group weak emergentists with non-reductive physicalists, but, as noted in Pereboom (2011), it is very 
difficult to formulate a non-reductive physicalist account that is clearly non-emergentist in the weak sense.  
It should be further noted that while all accounts of weak emergence are non-reductive physicalists, it’s not 
the case that all non-reductive physicalists are weak emergentists. I’m grateful to Jeff Watson for pushing 
me on this point. 
 
32 Jessica Wilson, “Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong,” in Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, 
eds. Tomasz Bigaj and Christian Wuthrich (Boston: Brill | Rodopi, 2015), 356. 
 
33 Wilson, “Metaphysical Emergence,” 354. 
 
34 Ibid., 362. 
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one could make the case that it does. She has written a “mini-manifesto” in support of 
naturalist metaphysics35 and has also shown her support for naturalism elsewhere.36 
Wilson has argued that naturalists should be necessitarians about the laws of nature.37 
The alternative, contingency, states that actual scientific properties could be governed by 
different laws in other possible worlds and, Wilson argues, this view “is in considerable 
tension with naturalism.”38 Assuming that strong emergence is a naturalistic view (which 
seems fair, due to Wilson’s stated commitments), then the emergence relation would be 
metaphysically necessary because “any world where the physical base properties are 
instanced will also be one where the emergent properties are instanced.”39 
3.3: The Strong Emergentist Answers Bennett 
Bennett’s first challenge, drawn from Wilson, that “genuine dualists have to think 
that all connections between physical properties and mental ones have to be completely—
even nomologically—contingent,”40 is unclear. What does Bennett mean by “genuine 
dualist"? Does she mean substance dualists? If so, then this objection does not apply to 
emergentists. If “genuine dualist” is not restricted to substance dualists, then perhaps 
Bennett thinks that all anti-physicalists must be like Chalmers—whom she mentions in 
this section—and only endorse contingent nomological relations between the mental and 
                                                 
35 Jessica Wilson, “Naturalist Metaphysics,” Michigan Philosophy News  (2003): 5-12. 
 
36 Wilson (2005). 
 
37 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations,” 444-445. 
 
38 Ibid., 438. 
 
39 Ibid. 
 
40 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. 
  15 
the physical.41 However, this appears to be a misreading of Wilson on the part of Bennett. 
Wilson argues for the compatibility of emergentism with physics,42 then argues if 
necessitarianism is true:  
then if there are emergent properties same-subject necessitated by physical 
properties in the actual world, it follows … that any world where the physical 
base properties are instanced will also be one where the emergent properties are 
instanced. Emergent properties will thus supervene with metaphysical necessity 
on their physical base properties.43 
In other words, if emergent properties are necessitated by physical properties in the actual 
world and necessitarianism is true, then in any world where the basal physical properties 
are instantiated, the emergent properties will be instantiated as well. If it’s the case that in 
any world where the basal physical properties are instantiated, the emergent properties 
will be instantiated as well, then the emergent properties will supervene with 
metaphysical necessity on the physical. Wilson clearly endorses and argues strongly for 
the compatibility of metaphysically necessary emergence and necessitarianism, so 
emergentists are unscathed. 
Bennett’s second challenge is to specify that “it is metaphysically necessary that 
everything strongly globally supervenes upon the physical, and not vice versa.”44 
Emergentists can accept this stipulation. The emergent relation between the physical and 
                                                 
41 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. 
 
42 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations,” 431. 
 
43 Ibid., 438. 
 
44 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 297. (emphasis in original) 
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the mental is, like Bennett’s qualified claim, asymmetrical. Because of this, emergentists 
will accept that any two worlds physically alike will be mentally alike and need not 
accept that any two worlds mentally alike will be physically alike as well.  
 How might the emergentist respond to Bennett’s third challenge—Hume’s 
dictum? If there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, 
intrinsically typed entities, then any emergence relation between distinct, intrinsically 
typed entities—e.g., between the physical and the mental—must be contingent. The 
emergentist may fall back on necessitarianism. Recall necessitarians hold that “any 
possible world where there exists a scientific property of a type that actually exists is a 
world where hold all the laws actually governing that property.”45 So, if in this world 
there is a nomic-emergence relation between brains and minds, then in any world where 
there are brains, there will also be minds.46 
Whether or not this is a satisfying response will depend on we have better reason 
to accept necessitarianism than Hume’s dictum. I follow Wilson, who strongly argues for 
naturalists needing to accept necessitarianism.47 Further, I take naturalism—the view that 
our philosophical views and methodologies should be consistent with our best scientific 
theories—to be common ground and will not argue for it here nor will I field objections 
                                                 
45 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations,” 438. 
 
46 Notice that this defense is only available to theories of emergence where the emergence relation is nomic. 
Theories of emergence which posit a brute emergence relation or other kinds of non-nomic relations will 
not be able to use this response as necessitarianism is a position about the necessity of laws, not of other 
relations. 
 
47 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations,” 438-445. 
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to naturalism.48 So, if we should be naturalists, then we should be necessitarians. If we 
are necessitarians and emergentism is an open epistemic possibility, then we should 
withhold judgement with respect to Hume’s dictum.49 
Why should naturalists accept necessitarianism? First, as a practice in the 
sciences, we define physical properties in terms of laws.50 For example, we think of mass 
in terms of the laws that govern mass—such as gravity. If we define physical properties 
in terms of the laws that govern them, then it seems that necessitarianism follows. This is 
because if physical property p is defined by the set of laws that govern it, then in any 
world where p exists, it will be governed by those laws. Second, we don’t “experience 
nor posit properties as persisting through changes in their governing laws.”51 Consider a 
case where you’re drinking coffee out of a metal mug. You take your sip then place the 
mug on your metal desk. When you let go, the mug begins to float above your desk. What 
would be the best explanation of this? There are two options. One option is that your mug 
has gained a property that it did not previously have (e.g., being magnetized); another 
option is that your mug has all the same properties, but some (or all) of those properties 
are no longer governed by the same laws. I think that the best explanation would be that 
                                                 
48 For what is probably the most famous and influential objection to naturalism, consult the evolutionary 
argument against naturalism in Plantinga (1993). 
 
49 To clarify, this argument isn’t to establish that Hume’s dictum is false. Rather, that we should withhold 
judgement on whether or not Hume’s dictum is true. If we should withhold judgement on Hume’s dictum, 
then it’s not a reason to reject strong emergentism. Further, because this argument relies on open epistemic 
possibilities, it would have been a dubious move to try to show that Hume’s dictum is false. This is because 
while we may not know anything now that rules out emergentism, it could be the case that we come to 
know something in the future that does. 
 
50 This is a fairly common view and a place of common ground with the Russellian monist, who accepts 
structuralism about physics. 
 
51 Wilson, “Supervenience-Based Formulations,” 440. 
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your mug has gained some new property. Consider what would be the case if the physical 
properties of the mug were no longer governed under the same laws, e.g., the mug’s 
property of having mass is no longer governed under gravitational laws. But, following 
the first reason, we seem to define physical properties in terms of laws. So, the property 
of mass is just to, in part, to play a role in gravitational relations. If something doesn’t 
play a role in gravitational relations, then it doesn’t have the property of mass. I now take 
it to be established that if one is a naturalist, then one should accept necessitarianism. 
Now it needs to be addressed whether strong emergence is an open epistemic 
possibility. By “open epistemic possibility,” I simply mean that strong emergence is not 
ruled out by what we know.52 The answer to this question may change as we continue to 
develop our scientific knowledge. However, emergentists have attempted to make the 
case that emergentism isn’t just consistent with our current knowledge, but is, in fact, the 
best explanation of various, higher-level scientific and social phenomena. I take the wide 
and continuing interest in emergentism as a research project in philosophy and the 
sciences to suggest that it is reasonable to believe that it is an open epistemic 
possibility.53 
                                                 
52 By arguing that strong emergence is an open epistemic possibility, I might be seen as undermining my 
own position in this paper. However, the goal of this paper is not to say that “we know that strong 
emergence is false.” Rather, the position is “if we take mental causation seriously, then we have good 
reason to reject strong emergence.” Of course, one could believe that one has good reason not to believe  
without saying one knows that ~. 
 
53 Suppose that all these emergentists are horribly misguided and strong emergentism is straightforwardly 
ruled out by some well-established scientific knowledge. In this case, all the better for me. I’m attempting 
to argue that emergentism can’t give a satisfactory account of mental causation, so we should reject it. But, 
if emergentism is ruled out by something that we already know, then that’s just a stronger reason to reject 
it.  
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To summarize the emergentist’s response to Bennett’s third challenge: we should 
be naturalists and naturalists should be necessitarians about the laws of nature. Further, 
it’s an open epistemic possibility that strong emergentism is true. If strong emergentism 
is true and necessitarianism is true, then every possible world physically identical to this 
one will be mentally identical as well because the nomic emergence relation would exist 
in all those worlds. This is a counterexample to Hume’s dictum and, as such, we should 
withhold judgement on Hume’s dictum. 
 Finally, emergentists must explain the apparent possibility of zombies. 
Emergentists will select Bennett’s (i)—zombies are not possible upon reflection—
because when one imagines a zombie world they are not taking into account the 
metaphysically necessary emergence of the mental from the physical. Therefore, while 
one might think that a zombie world is possible, it is not. Bennet is right that both 
physicalists and emergentists will reject the possibility with (i). However, they will 
accept (i) for reasons unacceptable to each other. Physicalists would not accept that there 
are necessary laws of emergence or other emergence relations. Bennett herself seeks to 
distance nonreductive physicalists from emergentists— “we should do our best to deny 
that we are in the same boat as emergentists.”54   
Perhaps a way of making this clearer is to consider that while Bennett is right that 
the non-reductive physicalist and the strong emergentist will agree about how to answer 
the possibility of zombies (although they will give vastly different reasons for their 
answer), they will not give the same answer when confronted with other famous thought 
experiments. Consider Mary when she comes out of the black and white room. The non-
                                                 
54 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 282. 
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reductive physicalist will say that the Mary case teaches us that our phenomenal concepts 
are confused. However, the emergentist will say that it teaches us the nature of qualia is 
distinct from the nature of physical things. Bennett places too much emphasis on 
metaphysical necessity in explaining mind. Our focus should be on the essential natures 
of things. So, while the physicalist and the emergentist can agree that the mind 
supervenes with metaphysical necessity on the physical (and can, therefore, accept the 
compatibilist strategy), they diverge wildly on what they take the essential nature of mind 
to be.55 
3.4: Strong Emergence and the Compatibilism Test 
 What’s necessary for a theory of consciousness to accept Bennett’s compatibilist 
strategy is for there to be a sufficiently “tight relation between mental and physical 
causes.”56 In order for the relation between the mental and physical causes to be 
sufficiently tight, a position must be able to deny the nonvacuous truth at least one of the 
following counterfactuals: 
(O1) if m had happened without p, e would still have happened: (m & ~p) ☐→ e 
(O2) if p had happened without m, e would still have happened: (p & ~m) ☐→ e57 
Emergentists are able also to deny the nonvacuous truth of (O2), there are no 
cases where there is p without m, as m is metaphysically necessitated by p in virtue of an 
                                                 
55 I’m grateful to Jeff Watson for discussion on this point. 
 
56 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 295. 
 
57 Ibid., 288-89. 
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emergence relation.58 Because emergentists are able to deny the nonvacuous truth of 
(O2), they are able to utilize Bennett’s compatibilist strategy.59 
4: Compatibilism and Opacity 
Thus far, it has been shown that some anti-physicalist position can accept 
Bennett’s compatibilist solution. However, does pairing compatibilism with these 
positions actually render the mental cause’s contribution intelligible and avoid the 
problem of opacity? Recall the problem of opacity was that it’s unclear what contribution 
the mental cause is making. Consider again the case of your deciding to pick up your 
drink. If the physical cause is sufficient to bring about your picking up your drink, then 
what difference is the mental cause making? The compatibilist attempts to solve the 
overdetermination problem by arguing there isn’t a problematic kind of 
overdetermination because the mental and physical causes are sufficiently tightly related. 
4.1: Does Compatibilism Help the Emergentist? 
 If the emergentist can accept the compatibilist solution, then the contribution of 
the mental’s unique causal power does not overdetermine its effect.60 If emergentism 
paired with compatibilism does avoid a problematic form of overdetermination, then, as I 
argued above, it must give a satisfactory answer to the opacity question. That is, it gives a 
satisfactory answer to the question of “where does the causal contribution from the 
mental go and how does it contribute to the outcome?”  
                                                 
58 The relation unspecified in the case of Wilson’s strong emergence. 
 
59 Other anti-physicalist theories of mind that posit metaphysically necessary supervenience and the mental 
being dependent on the physical will be able to pass this test. I will cover one such theory in the next 
chapter. 
 
60 Recall that the (strong) emergentist holds that emergent features have a unique causal power that the 
physical states it depends on does not. 
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Recall that the strong emergentist argue that the mind is an emergent, non-
physical entity distinct and distinctly efficacious from the brain states it depends on. 
Consider again the case where you pick up your drink on the table. The strong 
emergentist who embraces compatibilism says that there is a sufficient physical cause for 
your acting in the way you do and there is a sufficient non-physical, mental cause which 
acts on the physical world. I argued above that accepting completeness, a physical 
closure principle, requires accepting that the physical cause was sufficient to not only 
bring about your picking up your drink, but also to bring about your picking up your 
drink in the way that you did. As such, the emergentist cannot appeal to modal fragility to 
answer the opacity question. But, if the physical cause was sufficient to bring about your 
picking up your drink in the way that you did, then it is unclear what causal contribution 
the mental made.  
Compare this to Billy and Suzy throwing their rocks at the window, 
overdetermining the window breaking. The contribution of the second rock hitting the 
window is clear, it causes the window to shatter in a way it would not have shattered had 
there only been one rock thrown. The emergentist cannot give a satisfactory answer in 
this way, because the lifting of the drink with both causes is, on their account, the same as 
if there had just been the physical cause.61 Therefore, the opacity problem stands. 
 The emergentist is left with a dilemma. She can maintain her traditional response 
to the exclusion problem (deny completeness) or she can accept the compatibilist 
response (deny exclusion). If she maintains her traditional response, she must hold that 
                                                 
61 There being just the physical cause and not the mental cause is, on their account, metaphysically 
impossible. However, if the physical cause is truly sufficient to bring about your lifting the drink in the way 
that you do, then the emergentist is still committed to this. 
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the physical domain is not causally closed—an unpopular proposal, but one that makes 
clear the contribution of the mental cause. If we deny completeness, then it is not the case 
that every physical occurrence has a sufficient physical cause. Therefore, it would be the 
case that the mental and the physical causes were jointly sufficient to bring about the 
effect.62 If she accepts the compatibilist response, then the mental’s causal contribution is 
opaque—as such, it’s unclear why we should accept efficacy. The unattractiveness of 
these options are not “knock-down” arguments against the emergentist. However, these 
theoretical disadvantages are sufficient, I believe, to motivate us to look to other views as 
we move forward on developing a theory of consciousness. 
4.2: Does Compatibilism have an Opacity Problem? 
 One might worry, after reading the previous section, that what I have shown isn’t 
that emergentism, when paired with compatibilism, doesn’t solve the opacity problem. 
Rather, the worry goes, is that I have shown that compatibilism, regardless of which 
theory of mind it is paired with, doesn’t solve the opacity problem. In the next chapter, I 
will argue that compatibilism paired with Russellian monism is not plagued by problems 
or opacity. If the argument is successful, then it shows that opacity isn’t a problem with 
compatibilism, but with the view it’s paired with. 
5: Conclusion 
 In this paper I argued, contra Bennett, that the mental supervening on the physical 
with metaphysical necessity is not sufficient for the truth of physicalism. If my arguments 
have succeeded, then strong emergentists (as well as other theories of mind that can 
                                                 
62 They might also hold that the mental cause alone was sufficient to bring about the effect. But, this raises 
the question of what difference the contribution of the physical cause made. 
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accept metaphysically necessary supervenience) will be able to utilize Bennett’s 
compatibilist solution to the exclusion problem. I concluded by evaluating whether the 
compatibilist response to the exclusion problem is better for the emergentist than her 
traditional response (denying completeness). I argued that while compatibilism, does 
provide the emergentist with the benefit of accepting the causal closure of the physical, 
the compatibilist response leaves the mental’s causal contribution opaque, which makes 
the view unattractive.
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CHAPTER 2 
RUSSELLIAN MONISM, OPACITY, AND CAUSAL EXCLUSION 
It is said the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and 
comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. 
– George Berkeley (Principles, 2) 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that we should reject emergentism because it 
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the exclusion problem. Specifically, emergentists 
fail to answer the opacity question, “how does the mental cause contribute to the effect?” 
Traditionally, emergentists have accepted either a) mental causes overdetermine their 
effects or b) deny that the physical is causally closed, but others are reluctant to accept 
such rampant overdetermination in nature or deny causal closure.63 I offered a friendly 
amendment to the emergentist: accept the compatibilist solution, which does not require 
accepting overdetermination or denying causal closure. However, this view results in the 
causal contribution of the mental being opaque and, therefore, we should reject 
emergence if we are to be realists about mental causation. 
 What has yet to be shown is whether the Russellian monist is able to give a better 
response to the exclusion problem and the opacity question than the strong emergentist. 
In this chapter, I argue that the Russellian monist is able to accept the compatibilist 
solution. Further, I argue that the constitutive Russellian monist avoids opacity concerns, 
but the emergent Russellian monist faces opacity concerns similar to the strong 
                                                 
63 Wilson (2015) gives a typology of two kinds of emergence: weak and strong. Weak emergentists accept 
over determination, while strong emergentists deny causal closure. 
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emergentist. I begin by defining the view. Then, I briefly show how the Russellian monist 
can respond to Bennett’s challenges from the previous chapter. 
1: Russellian Monism 
Defenders of Russellian monism define the view in different ways. David 
Chalmers defines Russellian monism as “the conjunction of broad physicalism with the 
denial of narrow physicalism.”64 Here, narrowly physical properties are the structural 
properties of microphysical entities. Structural properties refer to properties that can be 
characterized wholly in terms of structural concepts—e.g., logical, mathematical, nomic, 
and spatiotemporal concepts.65 Further, these properties are characterized by discoveries 
in the physical sciences. While broadly physical properties are the structural properties of 
microphysical entities as well as quiddities. Quiddities are the “fundamental categorical 
properties that play the fundamental roles specified in physics” and “some quiddities are 
microphenomenal properties.”66 In other words, quiddities are the intrinsic properties of 
microphysical things that serve as the realizer or ground for structural roles described by 
physics, such as mass. 
According to Chalmers, consciousness is not explainable by the structural 
properties, but by the quiddities.67 To reiterate, Russellian monism is the view that the 
physical facts are comprised of structural facts (logical, mathematical, nomic, and 
                                                 
64 David J. Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” in Consciousness in the Physical World, ed. 
Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 261-62. 
 
65 Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” 255-56. 
 
66 Ibid., 245. 
 
67 Ibid., 261-62. 
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spatiotemporal) and intrinsic properties (quiddities), some of the latter are experiential (to 
borrow a term from Strawson).68 
In a similar vein, Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa define the position as the 
acceptance of (i) structuralism about physics, (ii) realism about inscrutables, and (iii) 
(proto-)phenomenal foundationalism. In other words, the properties that physics 
describes are all structural in nature (i), but there must be some non-structural properties 
(call these “inscrustables”) which ground these structural properties (ii) and some of these 
inscrutables are either phenomenal or protophenomenal in nature (iii).69 
What both explications have in common is that physics tells us about what the 
extrinsic properties of matter are—what matter does. However, it doesn’t tell us anything 
about the intrinsic properties of matter—what matter is. The Russellian monist sees this 
gap in our understanding of the physical world and suggests that here we might find a 
solution to the mind-body problem. The intrinsic properties of matter which realize or 
ground the extrinsic properties are, suggests the Russellian monist, (proto-)phenomenal 
properties.70 I will use this language for the remainder of the chapter. 
But, if what realizes or grounds fundamental properties in physics are phenomenal 
properties, what does that mean for macroscopic objects like us? How does the existence 
of micro-consciousness (consciousness in fundamental particles) relate to o-
                                                 
68 Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” in Consciousness and its 
Place in Nature (Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2006), 3-31. 
 
69 Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, “What is Russellian Monism?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 19, 
no. 9-10 (2012): 70-1. 
 
70 Philip Goff argues that these definitions are not sufficient, as they fail to differentiate Russellian monism 
from some forms of Type-B physicalism. However, the nuances of that issue are not relevant to the project 
in this chapter. The curious reader should consult Goff (2015) and Goff (2017). Goff’s definition of 
Russellian monism will be presented in Chapter 3. 
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consciousness (our pre-theoretical notion of consciousness in animals, ourselves, etc.)? In 
answer to these questions, the Russellian monist has many options. However, the two 
most prevalent views in the literature (and what will be discussed in this chapter) fall 
under two categories: constitutive micropsychism and intelligible emergentism. 
Constitutive Russellian monism is the variety of Russellian monism most 
commonly defended.71 According to the constitutive Russellian monist, microphenomenal 
properties ground macrophenomenal properties.72 That is, macrophenomenal properties, 
experiences of creatures like us, obtain in virtue of microphenomenal properties, the 
intrinsic properties of fundamental physical properties. Some require that the constitutive 
Russellian monist hold that the grounding relation is one of constitution and that the 
macrophenomenal properties are nothing over and above the microphenomenal 
properties. 73 I think we can use the term more loosely, such that we do not require 
constitution, but realization or some other relation to be the grounding relation. However, 
I agree that, in order to be a constitutive Russellian monist, one must hold that the 
macrophenomenal properties are nothing over and above the microphenomenal 
properties. 
Emergent Russellian monism is less commonly defended, but still an important 
view to consider.74 According to the emergent Russellian monist, macrophenomenal 
                                                 
71 See Alter & Nagasawa (2012), Chalmers (2015). 
 
72 Chalmers, Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, 254-255. 
 
73 Goff, Consciousness, 151. 
 
74 Goff (2015) defends a version of emergent Russellian monism against constitutive Russellian monism. 
However, Goff (2017) now defends a version of cosmopsychism. 
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properties are strongly emergent from microphenomenal properties.75 By “strongly 
emergent” it is meant that the macrophenomenal properties are something over and above 
the microphenomenal properties.76 This is similar to the strong emergentists of last 
chapter, but with a Russellian monist addition to the view. 
Russellian monists accept metaphysically necessary supervenience. Any two 
intrinsically physically identical worlds (that is, worlds with the same intrinsic properties 
of matter) would be mentally identical as well. It might appear that Russellian monism 
does not serve as a counter example to Karen Bennett’s view, and in fact supports it, 
because Russellian monism can be seen as a form of physicalism. In fact, one might have 
a hard time differentiating it from a form of identity theory where mental properties are 
identical to complex physical properties.77 The differences between Russellian monism 
and identity theory are subtle. First, the Russellian monist holds that macroexperience is 
explained by consciousness at more fundamental levels—such as fundamental particles. 
Identity theorists usually don’t hold to a version of panpsychism in this way. Further, the 
Russellian monist is able to accept multiple realization where the identity theorist cannot. 
Is Russellian monism a form of physicalism? There is no clear agreement among 
proponents of the view. Derk Pereboom considers it physicalism.78 Goff does not.79 
Chalmers splits the difference and sums it up nicely when he says, “While [Russellian 
                                                 
75 Chalmers, Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, 253. 
 
76 Goff, Consciousness, 151. 
 
77 Thanks to Steven Reynolds for pushing me to clarify. 
 
78 Pereboom (2011) presents Russellian monism as one of his titular prospects for physicalism. 
 
79 See Goff (2017). 
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monism] arguably fits the letter of materialism, it shares the spirit of anti-materialism.”80 
So, where should we fall on this? 
In defense of seeing Russellian monism as an anti-physicalist position, one might 
point out that physicalism is sometimes defined in terms of some future, completed 
physics. “All there is,” on this view, “is whatever properties are described by a completed 
physics.” On this understanding of physicalism, Russellian monism is an anti-physicalist 
project. Because, physics studies the extrinsic properties of matter, but the Russellian 
monist posits phenomenal intrinsic properties which ground or realize the extrinsic 
properties and explain consciousness. As such, the view posits more than any “completed 
physics” might, specifically phenomenal fundamental properties. So, the view isn’t 
physicalist.81 
One might not be convinced by the above and defend Russellian monism as 
physicalism in two ways. First, we don’t know what kinds of entities a completed physics 
will posit. As such, a completed physics might postulate fundamental conscious 
properties. This is a famous dilemma. Second, it seems that because Russellian monism 
says that (broadly) physical properties are phenomenal properties, that’s physicalism. 
                                                 
80 David J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature,” in The Character of Consciousness (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 134. 
 
81 This is reminiscent of a famous problem for physicalism, Hempel’s dilemma. According to Hempel’s 
dilemma, if we define physicalism in terms of the physical sciences, then either we mean i) the current 
sciences and physicalism is false (because our current understanding of physics is at best incomplete) or ii) 
a future, completed physics, which might posit entities intuitively incompatible with physicalism (like 
fundamental conscious properties). For a discussions of Hempel’s dilemma, see Papineau (1993), Wilson 
(2005), and Wilson (2006). 
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I’m inclined to split the difference here. Ultimately, “physicalism” and “anti-
physicalism” are technical terms of art which we can use and define as we please.82 But, 
if we want to capture the “spirit of the view,” then my feelings shift from day-to-day. 
Some days, Russellian monism strikes me as obviously anti-physicalist, as it seems 
against the “spirit of physicalism” to posit fundamental conscious properties. But, on 
other days, it seems to be physicalism, or something near enough. If the reader finds 
Russellian monism comfortably within the realm of physicalism, then she may skip the 
following section and proceed to section three, as the goal there is to show that Russellian 
monism (presented as anti-physicalist) is able to use Bennett’s compatibilist strategy, 
which she claims can only be used by physicalists. If, however, the reader finds 
Russellian monism to be anti-physicalist and accepts Bennett’s argument that only the 
physicalist can accept compatibilist, then they should proceed to section two. 
2: Russellian Monism and Compatibilism 
 In the previous chapter, I explicated Bennett’s compatibilist solution to the 
exclusion problem. On this view, the mental and physical causes do not overdetermine 
their effects, because the causes have a sufficiently tight relationship. In order to have this 
sufficiently tight relationship, Bennett argues that the mental must supervene on the 
physical with metaphysical necessity and gives four reasons why anti-physicalists 
positions can’t posit such a relationship. I argued that the strong emergentist could do 
this. In this section, I show how the Russellian monist can respond to those reasons and, 
as such, accept compatibilism.  
                                                 
82 Goff, Consciousness, 145-47. Here, Goff makes a similar point, but ultimately considers Russellian 
monism to be anti-physicalist, given his definition of physicalism. 
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2.1: The Russellian monist Responds to Bennett 
To avoid redundancy from the previous chapter, I won’t spill ink here restating 
Bennett’s reasons why the anti-physicalist couldn’t meet her four challenges. However, it 
would be good to keep in mind what her challenges were: 
1) “Genuine dualists” must accept that all physical-mental connections are 
contingent. 
2) The mental must supervene on the physical with metaphysical necessity and 
not vice versa. 
3) Hume’s Dictum. 
4) Why do zombies seem possible (and why does your answer not commit you to 
physicalism)? 
First, Russellian monists may not be the “genuine dualist” Bennett is addressing, 
which would make the objection that they must accept that all connections between 
physical and mental properties are contingent not applicable to them. As discussed in the 
previous section, it is unclear whether or not to categorize Russellian monism as a kind of 
dualism or physicalism. 
Assuming they are a “genuine dualist,” Russellian monists may respond by 
arguing that physics describes only structural properties or, following Chalmers, the 
narrow physical properties.83 If one accepts that there cannot be relations without relata 
or structures without things that are structured,84 then the existence of the properties 
                                                 
83 Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” 255. 
 
84 This view is controversial. A major alternative is Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). Ladyman (2014) is an 
excellent outline of structural realism, generally. But, for a book-length defense of OSR, consult Ladyman 
& Ross (2007). 
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described by physics necessitate the intrinsic properties because the intrinsic properties 
ground or realize85 the structural properties. 
Second, Russellian monists are not able to meet the requirement of asymmetric 
supervenience. If the extrinsic properties of some fundamental physical object have as its 
categorical basis some intrinsic property, which is phenomenal, then, the supervenience 
relationship between that structural property and that phenomenal property would seem 
to be symmetrical. However, the monist can challenge the relevance of the supervenience 
relation needing to be asymmetric.  
The first way to challenge the relevance of asymmetric supervenience is to recall 
that the motivation for the compatibilist account is the idea that if there is a sufficiently 
tight relation between a physical and a mental cause, then they do not over determine 
their effect. So, the criteria for accepting compatibilism should i) rule out theories of 
mind that don’t have a sufficiently tight relation between the mental and the physical and 
ii) prefer theories that explain why the mental and physical have such a metaphysically 
tight relationship. The reasoning for the first criterion is evident, the compatibilist 
position shouldn’t be available to theories of mind that don’t have a sufficiently tight 
relationship between the physical and the mental because it relies on there being such a 
relationship. The reason for the second criterion is less obvious, but I take it to be implicit 
in Bennett’s reasoning. The compatibilist aims to give an explanation for why mental 
causes don’t overdetermine their effects with physical causes. A good explanation, one 
might think, doesn’t involve unexplained relations. So, for compatibilism to be a good 
                                                 
85 Different views describe the relationship between intrinsic and structural or extrinsic properties 
differently. 
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explanation in response to the exclusion problem, it should preclude views that have 
unexplained metaphysically necessary connections between the mental and the physical. 
Bennett seems to think that this requires asymmetric supervenience. 
However, explaining the connection between the mental and the physical need not 
require asymmetric supervenience. Consider a physicalist identity theory where mental 
states just are some physical brain state. Such a view would accept metaphysically 
necessary supervenience, but the supervenience relation would not be asymmetric 
because the mental-physical relationship would be one of identity. However, we 
shouldn’t say that this view doesn’t explain the relationship between the mental and the 
physical just because they cannot accept an asymmetric supervenience relation.86 As such 
we should reject asymmetric supervenience as a criterion for accepting compatibilism. 
Alternatively, one might interpret Bennett as thinking that asymmetric supervenience 
represents a dependence relation. So, if A properties supervene on B properties and not 
vice versa, then, according to the view, A properties depend on B properties and not vice 
versa. As such, Bennett’s challenge that the mental must supervene on the physical and 
not vice versa is a requirement that only views which posit the mental depending on the 
physical can accept her compatibilism. 
The second way to challenge the relevance of asymmetric supervenience is to 
deny that requiring the mental to depend on the physical is a legitimate requirement. 
What motivates the requirement that the mental must depend on the physical? If it’s the 
assumption that the fundamental things are physical things, then there is a problem for 
Bennett. Bennett argues that we should be physicalists because only physicalists can 
                                                 
86 Of course, this isn’t the kind of explanation that solves the Hard Problem. 
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accept compatibilism.87 However, if the reason that only physicalists can accept 
compatibilism is because compatibilism presupposes that the fundamental things are 
physical things, then the argument becomes we should be physicalists because only 
physicalists can accept physicalism.88 
Therefore, because of the two reasons given above, the requirement that views 
accept asymmetric supervenience to be compatibilists is ill-motivated. 
Bennett’s third challenge is Hume’s dictum. Recall that Hume’s dictum states that “there 
are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed 
entities.”89 But, Russellian monism doesn’t posit a necessary connection between distinct, 
intrinsically typed entities. Rather, the Russellian monist views matter as having intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties, where there is a metaphysically necessary connection between 
the intrinsic properties (which are phenomenal) and the extrinsic properties they realize 
or ground (which are structural, nomic, or causal). So, this objection does not apply. 
Bennett’s fourth challenge, Russellian monists will reject the possibility of zombies. A 
world that is physically identical to ours, but lacks consciousness is not really possible 
because a world physically identical to ours duplicates the intrinsic properties of matter 
as well as the extrinsic properties. Further, replicating the intrinsic properties, which are 
phenomenal—which means the world would not be a zombie world. This is Bennett’s 
                                                 
87 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 280 
 
88 It might be objected that physicalists are not the only ones who accept that the fundamental things are 
physical things. For example, one might propose that the emergentist posits that the fundamental things are 
physical things and the mental emerges from complex physical structures. However, the emergentist sees 
the mental as fundamental as well, but also dependent. See, for example, Barnes (2012) and Wilson (2015). 
 
89 Jessica Wilson, “What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 80 no. 3 (2010): 595. 
  36 
(i)—zombies are not possible upon reflection.90 Russellian monists are not committed to 
physicalism by denying the possibility of zombies, as Bennett seems to imply. Russellian 
monists give very different reasons for (i) than physicalists do and physicalists would be 
reluctant to accept the broadening of the physical to include phenomenal intrinsic 
properties of matter (rather than the just the structural properties described by physics) 
that Russellian monists propose. 
The Russellian monist can say something similar to what was said on behalf of 
the strong emergentist in the previous chapter. Bennett is right that the non-reductive 
physicalist and the Russellian monist will agree about how to answer the possibility of 
zombies (although they will give vastly different reasons for their answer). However, 
they will not give the same answer when confronted with other famous thought 
experiments about the mind. Consider Mary when she comes out of the black and white 
room. The non-reductive physicalist will say that the Mary case teaches us that our 
phenomenal concepts are confused. However, the Russellian monist will answer that 
Mary shows that our way of thinking about the physical world is impoverished. Bennett 
places too much emphasis on supervenience in explaining mind. Our focus should be on 
the essential natures of things. So, while the physicalist and the Russellian monist can 
agree that the mind supervenes with metaphysical necessity on the physical (and can, 
therefore, accept the compatibilist strategy), they diverge wildly on what they take the 
essential nature of mind to be.91 
 
                                                 
90 See the previous chapter for more on this. 
 
91 I’m grateful to Jeff Watson for discussion on this point. 
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2.2: Russellian monism and the Compatibilism Test 
What is necessary for a theory of consciousness to accept Bennett’s compatibilist 
strategy is for there to be a sufficiently “tight relation between mental and physical 
causes.”92 Specifically, the relationship must be one of metaphysically necessary 
supervenience, which, according to Bennett, can only be accepted by the physicalist. To 
test if a view accepts metaphysically necessary supervenience it must be able to deny the 
nonvacuous truth of at least one of the following counterfactuals: 
(O1) if m had happened without p, e would still have happened: (m & ~p) ☐→ e 
(O2) if p had happened without m, e would still have happened: (p & ~m) ☐→ e93 
 I have argued that, despite Bennett’s four challenges, the Russellian monist is able 
to accept that the mental supervenes on the physical with metaphysical necessity. As 
such, Russellian monists are able to deny the nonvacuous truth of (O2) as there are no 
cases where there is p without m, as m is metaphysically necessitated by p in virtue of m’s 
being the intrinsic property of p. Because Russellian monists are able to deny the 
nonvacuous truth of (O2), they are able to utilize Bennett’s compatibilist strategy. 
Further, the Russellian monist is not only able to deny the nonvacuous truth of (O2), but 
also of (O1) because the m is the realizer or ground of p. 
3: Russellian Monism and Opacity 
In the previous chapter, I anticipated the following objection: I had not shown that 
emergentism suffers from the opacity problem, even when utilizing the compatibilist 
                                                 
92 Bennett, “Exclusion Again,” 295. 
 
93 Ibid., 288-89. 
  38 
solution. Rather, the objection goes, I have shown that compatibilism, regardless of 
which theory of mind it is paired with, doesn’t solve the opacity problem. Recall that the 
opacity problem is that it is unclear what difference the mental contribution is making. I 
ended with a promissory note that this objection would be addressed here, and it is time 
pay up.  
In this section, I argue that the constitutive Russellian monist can address the 
opacity problem, but the emergentist Russellian monist can’t. Further, I attempt to show 
that the constitutive Russellian monist in-principle avoids the opacity problem. That is, 
the structure of the constitutive micropsychist view is such that it will always avoid 
worries of opacity. That emergentist Russellian monist doesn’t have this feature is a 
reason against the view and for constitutive Russellian monism. 
But, first, I wish to address the formulation of the objection: compatibilism, 
regardless of which theory of mind it is paired with, doesn’t solve the opacity problem. 
The opacity problem is not a problem with solutions to exclusion, such as compatibilism. 
Rather, I take it that the opacity problem is a problem for theories of mind, not for 
solutions to the exclusion problem. Theories of mind, I think, fall prey to the opacity 
problem when they posit that mental causes are over and above the physical causes. 
3.1: Constitutive Micropsychism and Opacity 
 Recall that according to the Russellian monist, the phenomenal intrinsic 
properties realize or ground the structural properties of physics. As such, if there is some 
physical property, like mass, then there is some intrinsic property that is the basis for that 
physical property. Further, according to the constitutive Russellian monist, the intrinsic 
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properties of matter constitutively ground the o-phenomenal facts such that they are 
nothing over and above the intrinsic properties.  
The constitutive Russellian monist answers the opacity question by noting that, 
just as an intrinsic property is the basis for fundamental physical properties, my conscious 
states are the categorical basis for the physical properties of my brain. The intrinsic 
properties of my brain states are conscious states. As such, the difference the mental 
cause makes is that it is the basis for the physical cause. 
Consider a case where you pick up a glass of water on your desk. The firings of 
certain neurons in your brain are sufficient for your picking up the glass. Also, your 
desire to pick up the glass of water is sufficient for your picking up the glass. What 
difference does your desire to pick up the glass (the mental cause) make? Depending on 
your preferred Russellian monist terminology, it is the categorical basis for/intrinsic 
property of your brain state. 
Because mental states will be the basis for brain states in this way, there is never a 
question of what difference the mental cause is making—it’s the basis for the brain state. 
In this way, the constitutive Russellian monist is able to avoid the opacity problem. 
3.1: Intelligible Emergentism and Opacity 
 Recall that according to the emergentist Russellian monist, the deep material facts 
intelligibly cause the o-phenomenal facts and the o-phenomenal facts are something over 
and above the intrinsic property of matter. If the o-phenomenal facts are something over 
and above the intrinsic properties, then the emergent subject has some property distinct 
from the fundamental properties that it emerges from.  
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What is this distinct property? One option is that the emergent subject has a 
distinct causal power. If the emergent subject is distinct in this way, then this position 
faces the opacity problem in a similar way to Wilson’s strong emergentism.94 Recall the 
earlier example about picking up the glass of water. The emergent Russellian monist is 
committed to there being intrinsic properties which are the basis for the fundamental 
physical states the subject emerges from. Further, on the assumption of causal closure, 
the fundamental states are sufficient to bring about the lifting of the glass of water. But, 
because the emergent entity is distinctly efficacious, it’s unclear what contribution is left 
to be made. Further, because the emergent subject is over and above the fundamental 
properties, it is not the realizer / basis / ground for the fundamental states. Therefore, this 
version of the emergent Russellian monist does not avoid the opacity problem in the way 
the constitutive Russellian monist does. 
Alternatively, the emergent subject does not have a distinct causal power, but that 
the emergent subject and her desires or intentions are distinct from the fundamental 
entities she emerges from. This view results in a form of epiphenomenalism, as the 
emergent subjects and her desires are over and above the lower level properties she 
emerges from which are causally relevant. As such, borrowing from the earlier example, 
her desire to lift the cup isn’t the basis for the brain state, which is sufficient to pick up 
the cup. Rather, it is distinct and emergent from it. There is no opacity problem here, but 
it is at the cost of the mental being inefficacious. 
Given the reasoning above, if we are to be realists about mental causation and be 
Russellian monists, we should be constitutive Russellian monists and not emergentists. 
                                                 
94 See Chapter 1. 
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3.3: An Objection 
 Consider the following objection: in the previous chapter, I argued that we should 
reject strong emergentism because the mental cause’s contribution is opaque. That is, it is 
unclear what difference the distinct mental cause makes in bringing about the effect, 
because the physical cause is sufficient for bringing the effect about. However, the 
Russellian monist posits that phenomenal properties ground or realize the causal structure 
of physics. But, it is unclear how a phenomenal property can ground or realize a physical 
structural property. So, why doesn’t the Russellian monist face the same (if worse) 
problem?95 
 It should be noted that this isn’t, strictly speaking, an opacity concern. As I set up 
the opacity problem last chapter, it had to do with potential overdetermination cases 
where there’s a sufficient physical and mental cause. Phenomenal properties realizing 
fundamental physical role-playing properties is not an overdetermination case. Further, 
it’s not clear that the relationship between the phenomenal property and the physical 
property is one of causation. Not all grounding relations are causal relations. For 
example, the lump of clay being arranged a certain way grounds the statue. But, it doesn’t 
seem that the lump of clay being arranged a certain way causes the statue. 
 These clarifications aside, there does seem to be a tension here. It is unclear what 
an account of how phenomenal properties ground or realize physical properties would 
look like. No defender of Russellian monism, to my knowledge, even tries to lay out an 
account of this. So, we must ask ourselves, which is the worse bullet to bite: the opacity 
concern of how mental causes contribute to their effects (strong emergentism) or it being 
                                                 
95 I’m grateful to Bernard W. Kobes for this objection. 
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unclear how phenomenal properties could ground or realize physical properties 
(Russellian monism)? 
 One way to approach this question is to ask whether these difficulties hinder the 
theorist in what they are trying to achieve. I take it to be the case that both the Russellian 
monist and the strong emergentist are attempting to give an account of our experience of 
consciousness. However, the strong emergentist builds the causal efficacy of the mental 
into their account—that strongly emergent entities are distinctly efficacious is part of the 
definition.96 As such, the strong emergentist attempts to give an account of the mental as 
distinctively efficacious, but faces a problem as to how and in what way is the mental 
could be efficacious. In other words, their account makes problematic the exact 
phenomena they were trying to account for. 
 On the other hand, the Russellian monist faces a problem about relations at the 
fundamental level while trying to give an account of consciousness at the macroscopic 
level. This is not to say that there may be a problem accounting for how phenomenal 
properties could ground or realize physical properties (although, I am not convinced there 
is such a problem). Rather, it is just to say that the Russellian monist does not make 
problematic the exact phenomena they were trying to account for. 
 I am not convinced the Russellian monist faces a problem in accounting for how 
phenomenal properties ground or realize physical properties. The Russellian monist 
motivates her view through the theory of matter proposed by Bertrand Russell and Arthur 
Eddington, where physics tells us what matter does, but not what it is intrinsically. On 
this view, through empirical investigation we can only come to know of the extrinsic 
                                                 
96 See the previous chapter for a full explication of strong emergentism. 
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properties of matter. We are unable to investigate the intrinsic nature of matter in the way 
that we are able to investigate its extrinsic nature. As such, it appears that while the 
Russellian monist is unable to give an account of how phenomenal properties ground 
physical properties, it can give an account of why we may be epistemically blocked from 
understanding this relationship. 
4: Conclusion 
  I have argued above that Russellian monism is compatible with the compatibilist 
solution to the exclusion problem. Further, I have attempted to show that, unlike the 
strong emergentist, the constitutive Russellian monist does not face the opacity problem. 
However, the emergent Russellian monist position faces either the problem of opacity or 
must be epiphenomenalist. Therefore, if we wish to be realists about mental causation, 
then we should be constitutive Russellian monists.
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CHAPTER 3 
AGAINST FULL REVELATION 
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her 
secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; 
while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these 
objects entirely depends. 
– David Hume (Enquiry, Section IV, Part II) 
The most pressing issue facing the panpsychist is the combination problem and 
any defender of the view owes us some way of addressing it. The combination problem is 
really a family of related problems about how experience at the fundamental level relates 
to experience at the level of human beings.97  In this chapter, I address what has been the 
most common form of the problem: the subject summing problem. Briefly, the subject 
summing problem arises from our inability to understand how micro-subjects, the kind of 
subjects fundamental particles might be, combine to form o-subjects, the ordinary kinds 
of subjects we accept pre-theoretically. Notice, the subject-summing problem only arises 
for certain kinds of panpsychists, such as constitutive micropsychists who hold that 
micro-subjects intelligibly produce o-subjects. Cosmopsychists, who hold that the 
universe is the fundamental conscious object and that o-subjects are conscious in virtue 
of the universe being conscious, like Philip Goff, avoid the combination problem by not 
holding that o-subjects are caused by micro-subjects “combining.”98 Goff formulates a 
                                                 
97 Consult Chalmers (2016) for a thorough overview of the many combination problems. 
 
98 While cosmopsychists are able to avoid the subject-summing problem in virtue of the structure of their 
view, they do fall prey to other forms of the combination problem, such as the palette problem. 
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particularly difficult version of the problem. He argues that the epistemological principles 
which lead one to accept panpsychism should also push one to deny constitutive 
micropsychism. This leads to a dilemma for the constitutive micropsychist either the 
argument is sound and constitutive micropsychism is false or you deny one of the 
premises (which are supported by the reasons for being a panpsychist in the first place) 
and you are left without a justification for denying physicalism. 
Goff thinks we are in a special epistemological relationship with our conscious 
states such that we are super-justified in believing the content of our introspective 
judgements. For example, the judgement that pain has a what-it-is-like feel, formed when 
attending to that pain state. To be super-justified in believing a proposition is to have 
roughly the same degree of justification that you have in believing that 2 + 2 = 4.99 That 
we have this kind of justification in believing the content of our introspective judgements 
is an epistemological bedrock for Goff, something that needs explaining rather than 
something to be argued for. The best explanation, according to Goff, is full revelation—
introspection on conscious states directly presents the state in a transparent way, such that 
the complete nature of the state is apparent to the one introspecting.100 
While I am attracted to panpsychism as a way to solve the mind-body problem, I 
am not attracted to cosmopsychism. As such, I aim to defend constitutive micropsychism 
by arguing for an epistemologically weaker position than full revelation. Specifically, I 
will defend partial revelation which entails that phenomenal concepts are merely 
translucent. A concept is translucent if only part of its nature is revealed to the concept 
                                                 
99 Philip Goff, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Oxford University Press, 2017), 111-12. 
 
100 This is will be laid out in more detail later in the chapter. 
  46 
user in a transparent way. If the concept of subjecthood is translucent, then there is no 
problem with our not being able to understand a priori how subjects could combine. I 
attempt to motivate phenomenal translucency in two ways. 
First, I draw on Derk Pereboom’s qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis (QIH). QIH 
states that when we introspect on our mental states, we represent them as having 
qualitative natures that they don’t in fact have. Pereboom uses QIH to defend an 
eliminativism about qualitative natures. While I don’t think Pereboom is successful in 
using QIH to this end, I do think his observation that we can be mistaken about our 
qualitative experiences puts pressure on full revelation.101 
Second, I argue that Russellian monists should be naturally skeptical of something 
like full revelation as, I argue, they are committed to a certain kind of multiple 
realizability, such that conscious states can only be realized by material substances. 
Because they are committed to this and our direct phenomenal concepts do not reveal that 
our conscious states are essentially material, full revelation is false. 
1: Super-Justification, Revelation, and Subject-Summing 
 In this section, I first explicate Goff’s formulation of Russellian monism and, 
more specifically, constitutive Russellian monism.102 Then, I present Goff’s epistemology 
of consciousness and how it plays into his version of the subject-summing problem. 
 
                                                 
101 I don’t take Pereboom’s QIH to be very likely or compelling, but views like it (e.g., illusionism) have 
been consistently defended over the years and, as such, I think they deserve mentioning.  
 
102 In the previous chapter, I utilized Alter & Nagasawa’s (2012) and Chalmers’ (2015) definitions these 
views. While the differences between their formulations and Goff’s (2017) are slight, they are important. 
More pressingly, because Goff’s argument is the target of this chapter, it is prudent to work with his 
definitions to ensure that we are not talking past each other. 
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1.1: Russellian Monism 
 Russellian monism is best understood, according to Goff, as having a negative 
aspect and a positive aspect to its definition. We’ll take each in turn. 
Negative aspect – Material properties have a non-structural, categorical nature.103 
What does physics tell us about the world? According to the Russellian monist, physics 
gives us a description of the causal structure of the world. It tells us a lot about what 
matter does, but it tells us nothing about what matter is. Take the example of an electron. 
What is an electron? Physics tells us (put very, very simply) that an electron is a 
negatively charged particle. What is it to have negative charge? Well it means to attract 
positively charged things and repel negatively charged things. What physics has given us 
is a description of what the electron does, but not what an electron is in itself. This is not 
to downplay the contributions or impressiveness of the sciences. Through the sciences, 
we’ve be able to do extraordinary things, like put men on the moon and cure diseases. 
But, says the Russellian monist, there must be a categorical basis to the causal structure 
in nature.104 Science tells us a lot about the world, but it does not tell us what that 
categorical nature, or deep nature, of matter is. 
 The positive aspect of Russellian monism suggests an answer to what the deep 
nature of matter could be. 
                                                 
103 Goff, Consciousness, 143. 
 
104 This will not be argued for here. But, I will give some brief remarks here to attempt to motivate the 
view. Consider what would have to be the case if there were not a categorical basis to the causal structure 
in nature. Then there would only be relations without relata. Why might this be unlikely? Consider if there 
were no brothers, only brotherhood. The relationship of brotherhood exists, but there are no brothers to 
stand in that relation. 
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Positive aspect – the deep nature of matter explains consciousness. Further, the 
complete deep material truth a priori entails the complete phenomenal truth.105 
Philosophers have been stuck for centuries on the mind-body problem—how to fit 
consciousness into our material picture of the world. The sciences only tell us about the 
causal structure of the world, not about the categorical basis for that structure. According 
to Russellian monism, the deep nature of matter is the key to solving the mind-body 
problem. 
 Different kinds of Russellian monists think the deep nature of matter explains the 
phenomenal truths in different ways. Panprotopsychist Russellian monists hold that the 
deep material facts are protophenomenal properties. On this view, the deep nature of 
matter is not itself phenomenal, but is such that someone who understood the nature of 
these protophenomenal properties could come to explain consciousness a priori in o-
subjects. Panpsychist Russellian monists hold that the deep material facts are phenomenal 
facts. On this view, the deep material nature of fundamental physical entities are 
conscious and explain o-consciousness.106 For the remainder of this paper, the discussion 
will be centered on panpsychist formulations Russellian monism.107 
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107 Goff (2017) gives an argument from simplicity for the Russellian monist preferring panpsychism to 
panprotopsychism, which I am sympathetic to. According to the argument, if we are to posit that matter has 
an intrinsic nature, the more parsimonious view is to hold that all matter is intrinsically phenomenal rather 
than merely some matter being intrinsically phenomenal. 
  49 
 But, in what way does the deep material nature explain consciousness? According 
to the constitutive Russellian monist, the deep material facts constitutively ground the o-
phenomenal facts such that they are nothing over and above the deep material facts.108 
 If we take the fundamental things in the world to be the fundamental particles 
investigates by physics, then according to Russellian monism, those fundamental physical 
entities would be the fundamental conscious entities—micropsychism. Constituitive 
micropsychism is the view that micro-subjects ground o-subjects.109 This is the view I 
will defend from the subject-summing problem.110 
 Now that the Russellian monist groundwork has been laid down, we can now 
move to exploring Goff’s epistemology of consciousness and how it leads to the subject 
summing problem. 
1.2: Super-Justification and Full Revelation 
 Consider a case where you are walking through your living room and stub your 
toe on the coffee table. Further, consider introspecting on your conscious states 
immediately after you stub your toe, forming a direct phenomenal concept of your 
conscious state. That is, a “phenomenal concept of a conscious state the content of which 
is wholly based on attending to that state.”111 In this case, the direct phenomenal concept 
has the content that your conscious state has a certain feel to it or a what-it-is-like 
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110 My defense of constituitive micropsychism also defends the emergentist micropsychist from the subject-
summing problem. However, I think there are other reasons to reject emergentist micropsychism, some of 
which are parallel to my reasons for rejects strong emergentism in the first chapter. 
 
111 Goff, Consciousness, 107. 
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component—specifically, painfulness. Now, what would you say if someone asked you 
“are you sure that you’re in pain right now?” 
 I think an appropriate response to such a remark would be incredulity at the very 
question. Of course you’re feeling pain! Why else would you hopping around holding 
your foot in that way? That you are feeling pain in that moment and you know it through 
introspecting on that conscious state doesn’t seem like the kind of thing you could be 
wrong about. If you’re inclined to accept this way of thinking, then you may be inclined 
to accept super-justification. 
 Super-justification is the thesis that we are justified in believing the propositional 
content of our introspective judgements to a similar degree that we are in basic 
mathematical judgments, such as 2 + 2 = 4.112 Note that this is a thesis about 
introspective judgments, judgments formed by reflecting on your current experience. The 
super-justification thesis is not about perceptual judgments. Consider again the case of 
stubbing your toe on a coffee table. You are super-justified in believing that you’re are 
experiencing pain, the view says nothing about your belief that there is a coffee table in 
front of you.  
 Goff takes our super-justification in believing the content of some of our 
introspective judgments to be an epistemological bedrock “upon which [he] shall build 
[his] argument.”113 As such, he provides no argument for it, but instead takes it as 
something that needs explaining. I am in agreement with Goff about super-justification. 
Where I disagree is in what Goff takes to be the explanation: full revelation. 
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Full Revelation – In having a direct phenomenal concept of token conscious state 
C, C is directly presented to the concept user, in such a way that (i) the complete 
nature of the type to which C belongs is apparent to the concept user, and (ii) the 
concept user knows with super-justification that C exists.114 
In contrast with full revelation, there is partial revelation. 
Partial Revelation – In having a direct phenomenal concept of conscious state C, 
some aspect A of C is directly presented to the concept user, in such a way that (i) 
the complete nature of the type to which A belongs is apparent to the concept 
user, and (ii) the concept user knows with rational certainty (or something close to 
it) that A exists.115 
Put simply, the difference between full and partial revelation is that while full revelation 
holds that the direct phenomenal concept reveals the complete essential nature of your 
conscious state while partial revelation suggests that only part of the essential nature of 
the state is revealed to you. Full revelation entails that our direct phenomenal concepts 
are transparent, they reveal the full nature of the states they denote. In contrast, partial 
revelation entails that our direct phenomenal concepts are translucent, they only reveal 
part of the essential nature of the conscious states they denote. 
1.3: Goff’s Subject-Summing Problem 
 Now we have all the theoretical background in place to lay out Goff’s subject 
summing problem. According to the constitutive Russellian monist, micro-subjects 
intelligibly produce o-subjects. That is, if some agent had a transparent understanding of 
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the nature of micro-subjects, they could a priori come to understand the nature of o-
subjects. Because the production is intelligible. 
1) If micro-subjects intelligibly produce o-subjects, then it’s not conceivable that 
there be micro-subjects (arranged as they are) and no o-subjects. 
However, it seems like no additional subject is entailed by any group of subjects. 
Consider Jose, Amy, and Paul, sitting in a room together. It’s conceivable that there is no 
subject in that room other than Jose, Amy, and Paul. Call this the conceivable isolation of 
subjects (CIS): For any group of subjects, S1, S2, … Sn, it’s conceivable that there is no 
subject S* such that S* is not identical with any of S1, S2, … Sn.116 Why is the isolation of 
subjects conceivable? According to the defender of full revelation, it’s because the full 
nature of subjecthood is revealed to us by our direct phenomenal concepts and nothing 
revealed in that nature explains how subjects could combine. CIS gets us premise two: 
2) It is conceivable that there could be micro-subjects (arranged as they are) and no 
o-subjects. 
From premises one and two, by modus tollens, we get: 
C) So, it’s not the case that micro-subjects intelligibly produce o-subjects. 
Further, if it’s not the case that micro-subjects intelligibly produce o-subjects, then 
constitutive micropsychism is false. 
 How is the constitutive micropsychist to respond? Here is my proposal: If we can 
deny full revelation, then the best explanation for super-justification is partial revelation. 
If partial revelation is true, then our direct phenomenal concepts only reveal part of the 
essential nature of our conscious states. If only part of the essential natures of our 
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conscious states are revealed to us, then we can deny premise one. This is because while 
part of the essential nature of subjecthood is revealed to use, the full nature isn’t. Further, 
I propose, part of the essential nature that isn’t revealed to us could explain how subjects 
combine. As such, the true version of premise one should read: 
1*) If micro-subjects intelligibly produce o-subjects, then it’s not conceivable (to 
an agent with a transparent concept of subjecthood) that there be micro-subjects 
(arranged as they are) and no o-subjects. 
Further, CIS (premise two) is a premise about how we conceive of subjects, through our 
translucent concept of them. We do not know if a transparent concept user of subjecthood 
could conceive of micro-subjects (arranged as they are) and no o-subjects. So, we have 
no justification for asserting: 
2*) It is conceivable (to an agent with a transparent concept of subjecthood) that 
there could be micro-subjects (arranged as they are) and no o-subjects. 
Because we are unable to defend two*, the constitutive micropsychist is safe from the 
subject-summing problem. For the remainder of the paper, I attempt to motivate the 
denial of full revelation necessary for this defense.117 
2. Qualitative Inaccuracy 
 In this section, I present the first motivation for partial revelation—Pereboom’s 
qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis (QIH). I begin by laying out the view and what 
                                                 
117 I confess that this defense isn’t very satisfying, in the sense that if one is looking for an account of how 
it is that micro-subjects combine to form o-subjects, I’m not the one to tell you. But, I wish to be 
intellectually honest in my account. As such, the best answer I think the constitutive panpsychist can give 
to the subject-summing problem is that it is unknown how subjects combine, but here’s an account of why 
it’s unknown. 
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Pereboom uses it to argue for. Then, I explain why Pereboom is mistaken. I conclude this 
section by showing how QIH motivates partial revelation. 
2.1: What is Qualitative Inaccuracy? 
Common anti-physicalist arguments, such as the knowledge and conceivability 
arguments, focus on phenomenal consciousness and qualitative states—e.g., the 
conscious sensation of seeing a red flower or tasting a glass of wine. These arguments 
attempt to show that the qualitative natures we represent phenomenal properties to have 
are “distinct from any features that physical theories represent them as having.”118 This 
view arises from two common intuitions that play into anti-physicalist arguments. 
Pereboom phrases the first as: 
(i) Both the physical and introspective modes of presentation represent a 
phenomenal property as having a specific qualitative nature, and the 
qualitative nature that the introspective mode of presentation represents 
the phenomenal property as having is not included in the qualitative nature 
the physical mode of presentation represents it as having.119 
In other words, when we introspectively represent a phenomenal property, we represent it 
as having a qualitative nature that the physical mode of presentation does not represent it 
as having. Thus, there is more in our introspective representation than in the physical 
mode of presentation. Pereboom takes this first intuition as common ground. Pereboom 
phrases the second intuition as: 
                                                 
118 Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 3.  
 
119 Pereboom, Consciousness, 13. 
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(ii) The introspective mode of presentation accurately represents the 
qualitative nature of the phenomenal property. That is, the introspective 
mode of presentation represents the phenomenal property as having a 
specific qualitative nature, and the attribution of this nature to the 
phenomenal property is correct.120 
That is, the additional qualitative nature in the introspective mode of presentation that is 
not in the physical mode of presentation is taken by us to be the correct way of 
representing the world. This is the intuition that Pereboom challenges in order to defend 
physicalism.  
Pereboom argues that there is an “open possibility that our introspective 
representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves” because 
“introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic 
qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties actually lack such features.” 
Introspective representations mediate a subject’s awareness of mental states, but are 
wholly distinct from those states. Because the representation is distinct from (and is an 
indirect awareness of) the mental state, the way the introspective representation 
represents the qualitative nature of the mental state could be inaccurate.121 The qualitative 
nature being inaccurately represented in our representations is the what-it-is-like-to-X 
quality—where “X” can stand for various qualitative natures like “see a red flower” or 
“taste wine.”  
                                                 
120 Pereboom, Consciousness, 13 (emphasis in original). 
 
121 Ibid., 3-9. 
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In other words, while we represent our mental states as having a what-it-is-like 
nature, the mental states as they are in themselves do not have this property. This amounts 
to a form of eliminativism about qualitative natures.122 If our mental states do not have a 
what-it-is-like nature, then common anti-physicalist arguments (such as the 
conceivability or knowledge arguments) are mistaken and physicalism is unscathed by 
their attacks. 
2.2: Why we shouldn’t accept Pereboom’s Conclusion 
Pereboom gives an example of qualitative inaccuracy in action. Imagine a pledge 
is being initiated into a fraternity. He is shown a razor and told that it is going to be 
pulled across his neck while he is blindfolded. When he feels a sensation on his neck, he 
cries out, believing he is in pain. After a moment, he realizes that he is actually feeling 
coldness. The blindfold is removed and he sees the icicle that was used. The pledge, 
according to Pereboom, misrepresents his sensation of cold for a sensation of pain and 
realizes this misrepresentation.123 Pereboom wants this example to show that there can be 
a discrepancy between how we introspectively represent a qualitative nature and its real 
nature—such as misrepresenting cold for pain. If this could happen, even rarely, then 
Pereboom believes that it gives us reason to accept QIH.124 
                                                 
122 Pereboom argues that his position is not truly eliminativist. (pp. 43-46) That is, he’s not eliminativist in 
the sense that he’s arguing there’s no such thing as consciousness. But I think it’s clear that he’s 
eliminativist in the sense that consciousness, as we ordinarily think about it (as having a what-it-is-like 
quality) doesn’t exist.  
 
123 Pereboom (2011, 22) takes this example from Christopher Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type 
Materialism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 128-29.  
 
124 Derk Pereboom, “Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 86 no. 3 (2013): 754. 
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There are two plausible interpretations of this example which don’t support 
Pereboom’s ultimate goals.125 On the first interpretation, the pledge isn’t wrong about 
which qualitative nature he believes he is experiencing. He really does experience pain 
followed by cold. Perhaps what he was told to expect affected his experience. It seems 
like the more details of the thought experiment we consider, the more plausible this 
response becomes. The pledge is shown the razor and blindfolded, being told it is going 
to be pulled across his neck. He’s afraid, he’s anticipating pain, and his senses are 
heightened from his fear. Then, something touches his neck and begins to travel across it. 
As the ice melts, liquid drips down the pledge’s neck—“is that blood?” In his anticipation 
and with this sensory input, he screams out in pain. Then, the effects of his expectations 
on his experience dwindle upon reflection and concentration on what is happening to 
him, he calms down and begins to feel cold. For obvious reasons Pereboom’s QIH fails 
under this interpretation because the pledge does not inaccurately represent the 
qualitative nature of his experiences. 
This response seems to be in line with our everyday experiences. When I 
approach someone who is ticklish and put my hand near their side, they might giggle and 
jump away in anticipation and expectation. It seems acceptable that their giggling and 
jumping away was caused by a mild sensation of being tickled that was caused by the 
anticipation and expectation of being tickled. While some might find this interpretation 
intuitive, the following interpretation might be more charitable to Pereboom’s overall 
view. 
                                                 
125 I don’t intend for these two interpretations to be exhaustive of the possibilities. However, I do think that 
they are live possibilities. That is, given what we know, either is possible. 
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On the second interpretation, the pledge is wrong about the specific qualitative 
nature that his experience has, but is not wrong that it has a qualitative nature. In this 
case, one could concede that the pledge misrepresents his qualitative experience as 
having a qualitative nature it does not have—i.e., pain. However, the pledge is not wrong 
that his experience has some qualitative nature. After all, “being wrong about the specific 
qualitative nature you’re experiencing” is distinct from “being wrong that you’re 
experiencing some qualitative nature.” One could concede cases of “mis-feeling” a 
specific qualitative nature and not concede that the pledge’s experience actually had no 
qualitative nature—what Pereboom ultimately requires because any qualitative nature 
that has a what-it-is-like aspect would bring about the same problem for physicalism that 
Pereboom is trying to avoid.  
To further this concession, one could imagine that the pledge is wrong about 
every specific qualitative nature he believes he experiences, he is maximally qualitatively 
inaccurate. In every experience, he misrepresents the qualitative nature of that 
experience. But, even in this exaggerated version of Pereboom’s example where the 
pledge is systematically misrepresenting the qualitative nature of his experience, it 
doesn’t follow that he is wrong that he is having experiences with qualitative natures.  
Pereboom needs to give us a reason to rule out these interpretations. If the pledge 
does not inaccurately represent any qualitative nature (he accurately represents his mental 
states has have the qualitative nature of pain and then having the nature of coldness), then 
the QIH fails because there is no inaccurate representation. If we concede that the pledge 
does inaccurately represent the qualitative nature, then it does not follow that he does not 
experience a qualitative nature —which Pereboom needs. 
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3.2.3: QIH and Revelation 
 Recall the second possible interpretation of Pereboom’s example, the pledge is 
wrong about the specific qualitative nature that his conscious state has, but is not wrong 
that it has a qualitative nature. That is, when the icicle first touches the pledge’s neck and 
he screams out in pain, the pledge is wrong that his mental state has a qualitative nature 
of pain, but he is not wrong that his conscious state has some qualitative nature. The 
possibility of this interpretation serves as a reason to not accept full revelation. Recall 
that full revelation is the position that phenomenal concepts reveal the full nature of the 
conscious states they refer to.  
Let’s rephrase the interpretation of this case in terms of revelation. When the 
icicle touches the pledge’s neck his conscious state is presented to him under the 
phenomenal concept of pain, however the nature or the conscious state is not actually the 
painfulness, but rather of some other qualitative state. When put this way, the case is a 
clear counterexample to full revelation, because the phenomenal concept the pledge has 
does not reveal the nature of the conscious state. 
Some might find the nature of QIH and Pereboom’s example implausible. I am 
somewhat sympathetic to this response. However, varieties of illusionism about 
consciousness are becoming more commonly defended in the literature.126 In the next 
section, I attack full revelation from the position of realism about phenomenal 
consciousness. 
 
 
                                                 
126 In Frankish (2017), Frankish and others defend illusionism from realists about conscious experience. 
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3: Russellian Monism 
 In this section, I attempt to show that the Russellian monist’s commitments might 
undermine full revelation and motivate partial revelation.  
3.1: What does a Counterexample to Full Revelation Look Like? 
 The intention of this paper is to provide a reason to reject full revelation. It would 
be prudent to consider what might, at first glance, look like a promising objection to full 
revelation, but is not ultimately successful. But, while this objection is not successful, it 
does, I think, hint at a successful strategy.  
Consider this objection: a direct phenomenal concept of some conscious state, C, 
doesn’t reveal that C is grounded in, realized by, or emergent from some brain state 
(which is part of the complete nature of C).127 Therefore, the full revelation thesis is false 
because the direct phenomenal concept doesn’t reveal the full nature. 
 At first glance, this seems like a straightforward way to reject full revelation. 
However, the objection fails. Assume C is some pain state and is grounded in, realized 
by, or emergent from c-fibers firing in humans. But, pain, the type to which C belongs, 
isn’t essentially c-fibers firing. For example, stipulate that when octopi experience pain, 
their feeling of pain is grounded in, realized by, or emergent from o-fibers firing. Thus, 
because conscious states are multiply realizable, full revelation does not entail that the 
direct phenomenal concept reveals the basal brain state because C being grounded in, 
realized by, or emergent from that brain state isn’t part of the essential nature of that type. 
Therefore, given multiple realizability, this objection fails.   
                                                 
127 The constitutive Russellian monist is committed to o-conscious states being grounded or realized. The 
consmopsychist is committed to grounding. The emergent Russellian monist is committed to it being 
emergent. Therefore, this list is exhaustive of the possibilities. 
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3.2: Does Russellian Monism Give Us Reason to Reject Full Revelation? 
 While the previous objection fails, I think it hints at what a successful objection 
might look like. I will press this, I think, successful, objection in this subsection. The 
objection goes as follows. 
 The previous objection failed because of the multiple realizability of conscious 
states. However, the Russellian monist, I argue, is not committed to an unqualified view 
of multiple realizability. Rather, the Russellian monist is committed to a qualified view of 
multiple realizability, which I will call material multiple realizability. According to 
material multiple realizability, conscious states are only realizable by material substance. 
The Russellian monist is committed to this position because the Russellian monist i) 
identifies the deep nature of matter with phenomenal properties which ii) ground, realize, 
or otherwise intelligibly causes o-conscious states, like pain. If the deep nature of matter 
is phenomenal properties, then there could not be conscious states realized by non-
material substances. As such, the Russellian monist should deny what I will call non-
material multiple realizability, the position that conscious states can be realized by non-
material substances, like Cartesian souls. The Russellian monist, on my view, can allow 
for the possibility of Lieutenant Commander Data, but not for Casper the Ghost. 
Because the Russellian monist is committed to material multiple realizability, 
they are committed to full revelation being false. The direct phenomenal concept of some 
conscious state, C, does not reveal that C is grounded in or realized by the deep nature of 
matter. But, that C is grounded in or realized by the deep nature of matter is part of C’s 
essential nature because the Russellian monist posits that o-level conscious states are 
explained by the deep nature of matter. As such, the Russellian monist is committed to 
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conscious states being essential material. Therefore, if conscious states are essentially 
material and the direct phenomenal concept does not reveal that C is essentially material, 
then full revelation is false. 
 To summarize the argument, if conscious states are multiply realizable and 
Russellian monism is true, then, I have argued, conscious states are only realizable by 
material substances.128 If conscious states are only realizable by material substances, then 
conscious states are essentially material. If conscious states are essentially material and 
full revelation is true, then a direct phenomenal concept of some state should reveal that 
the state is material. However, our direct phenomenal concepts don’t reveal that our 
conscious states are essentially material. Thus, either conscious states are not essentially 
material or full revelation is false. The Russellian monist, I have argued, is committed to 
conscious states being essentially material. Therefore, if Russellian monism is true, then 
full revelation is false. 
4: Some Notes on Partial Revelation 
If full revelation is false and we are super-justified in believing the content of our 
introspective judgements, then we should accept partial revelation. Recall that partial 
revelation states: 
Partial Revelation – In having a direct phenomenal concept of conscious state C, 
some aspect A of C is directly presented to the concept user, in such a way that (i) 
the compete nature of the type to which A belongs is apparent to the concept user, 
                                                 
128 If you deny multiple realizability, then the objection in the previous subsection succeeds and full 
revelation is false. 
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and (ii) the concept user knows with rational certainty (or something close to it) 
that A exists.129 
 Goff is correct that super-justification needs explaining. But, if full revelation is 
false, then it can no longer serve as an explanation for super-justification. While I have 
argued that full revelation is false, my argument does not entail partial revelation is false. 
Partial revelation allows for our having the kind of epistemic access to our mental states 
to account for super-justification, but allows us to avoid my objection to full revelation.  
Partial revelation, as noted earlier, entails phenomenal translucency, the thesis 
that our phenomenal concepts are translucent, i.e., that part of the nature of the state is 
revealed to the concept user in a transparent way. Goff states that defenders of direct 
phenomenal translucency “need to tell us, for example, exactly which features of 
subjecthood are transparently revealed and which are hidden, and how this precise blend 
of transparency and opacity rules out physicalism while leaving mental combination a 
possibility.”130  The defender of phenomenal translucency holds that the entire essential 
nature is not revealed; the part of the essential nature that isn’t revealed is what is denoted 
by Goff’s use of “opaque.” 
To answer this challenge, I submit that what’s transparently revealed is the what-
it-is-like feel of the conscious state. However, I don’t think that the defender of partial 
revelation or phenomenal translucency can give a full account of which aspects of a 
conscious state’s essential nature are opaque. This is because those aspects are opaque 
and, as such, we don’t have access to them. To require the defender of partial revelation 
                                                 
129 Goff, Consciousness, 120. 
 
130 Ibid., 179. 
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and phenomenal translucency to give an account of these features is, in a way, stacking 
the deck in his favor. This is not to say that the defender of partial revelation cannot 
suggest which features may be opaque. For instance, if my argument in the last 
subsection is correct, then one opaque aspect of the conscious state is that it is essentially 
material.  
Further, I would suggest that we might suppose that another opaque aspect has to 
do with how subjects combine. This is for two reasons. First, there are strong motivations 
for accepting constitutive micropsychism because of its ability to bridge the gap between 
the physicalists and the dualists and, especially, its ability to give a satisfying account of 
mental causation.131 Second, it is clear that, despite these strengths, the constitutive 
micropsychist needs to give a response to the subject-summing problem.132 While the 
subject-summing problem is a strong challenge to the view, the explanatory strengths of 
constitutive micropsychism should give us reason to not take the problem as a 
knockdown objection. Rather, just as Russell and Eddington saw the deep nature of 
matter as a gap in our understanding of the world in which we could neatly fit 
consciousness, we should see the opaque parts of our understanding of the essential 
nature of conscious states as a place to locate the combining aspect of subjects. 
However, I do think that it’s possible that mere suggestions as to what the opaque 
nature is might be the best we can do. One might think that the best access we have to the 
essential nature of conscious states is through introspection. But, if introspection does not 
reveal the complete essential nature of that state (partial revelation), then, I think, we 
                                                 
131 See Chalmers (2015). 
 
132 See Section 1.3. 
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should be skeptical about our prospects of investigating and giving a full account of those 
aspects. 
5: Conclusion 
 If full revelation is true, then constitutive micropsychism is false. This is because 
if we have access to the full essential nature of our conscious states and cannot conceive 
of subjects combining, then they don’t combine. However, I have argued that full 
revelation is false and, as such, we should accept the weaker position of partial 
revelation. Partial revelation doesn’t guarantee the truth of constitutive micropsychism. 
Rather, it merely points to a gap in our knowledge such that we can explain why we 
cannot understand how subjects combine.
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